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Review	for	Contemporary	Political	Theory	
	
The	Practice	of	Political	Theory:	Rorty	and	Continental	Thought	
Clayton	Chin	
Columbia	University	Press,	New	York,	2018,	xi+293pp,	ISBN:	978-0-231-17398-8	
	
Why	Richard	Rorty	now?	A	long	time	has	passed	since	it	was	commonplace	to	pay	him	
the	tribute,	with	varying	degrees	of	affection	and	irritability,	of	ritual	denunciation	
and/or	to	preface	papers	with	a	seemingly	obligatory	prophylactic	warning	to	the	effect	
that,	whatever	far-fetched	assertion	was	on	its	way,	it	did	not,	of	course,	go	as	far	as	
Rorty.			
	 In	this	timely	and	significant	book,	Clayton	Chin	contributes	to	an	important	new	
wave	of	writing	about	Rorty	and	pragmatism	that	seeks	to	offer	a	bracingly	positive	
answer	to	this	question.	He	painstakingly	puts	Rorty’s	work	in	conversation	with	a	
range	of	contemporary	theoretical	positions,	which	he	gathers	under	the	rubric	of	
continental	political	thought.	Wisely	narrowing	the	scope	of	the	latter,	Chin	in	particular	
seeks	to	tease	out	the	relationship	between	Rortyan	pragmatism	and	the	kind	of	
approach	captured	a	little	while	ago	by	Stephen	White’s	concept	of	‘weak	ontology’.	
While	these	perspectives	share	criticisms	of	ideal	liberal	theory,	rejecting	what	they	
take	to	be	its	excessively	abstract	normative	vision,	they	provide	two	contending	
pathways	for	a	post-foundational	conception	of	political	theory.	Weak	ontologists	think	
that	some	particular	view	of	political	reality,	‘both	fundamental	and	contestable,	both	
unavoidable	and	ungrounded’	(p.	16),	is	needed	in	order	to	ground	political	claims.	For	
the	Rortyan	pragmatist,	there	is	only	‘cultural	politics’,	the	process	of	trying	to	provide	
more	fruitful,	humane	and	useful	descriptions:	the	ontologists’	effort	to	get	things	right	
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is	just	likely	to	be	a	relatively	fruitless	endeavour.	In	elaborating	this	contrast,	Chin	
reads	Rorty	as	making	a	distinctive	theoretical	intervention	‘at	the	meta-level,	
concerned	with	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	inquiry.	The	main	task	of	the	theoretician	
is	to	negotiate	between	our	various	vocabularies’	(p.	60).	This	surprisingly	Kantian-
sounding	project	‘can	structure	interframework	dialogue,	as	a	shared	linguistic	practice,	
in	a	way	that	avoids	presuming	the	standards	of	any	particular	perspective,	while	
remaining	reflective	and	critical’	(p.	60).	Chin	develops	this	argument	in	the	three	parts	
of	his	book.		
	 Part	1	outlines	the	contours	of	Rorty’s	work,	from	the	earlier	Peirce-	and	
Wittgenstein-inspired	reflections	on	metaphilosophy,	via	the	critique	of	epistemology	in	
Philosophy	and	the	Mirror	of	Nature	and	its	invocation	of	hermeneutics	as	an	alternative	
philosophical	method,		to	the	later	Deweyan-inspired	(however	interpretatively	
dubious)	project	of	locating	authority	in	human	purpose	and	social	practice.	This	last	
project,	which	Chin	only	sees	as	reaching	fruition	in	Rorty’s	later	work	under	the	rubric	
of	‘cultural	politics’,		notoriously	seeks	to	replace	objectivity	with	solidarity,	which	Chin	
glosses	as	the	obligation	‘to	seek	as	much	intersubjective	agreement	as	possible	…	to	
subject	our	claims	reflexively	to	as	many	linguistic	challenges	as	possible’	(p.	59).	In	the	
absence	of	neutral	theoretical	criteria,	cultural-political	argument	is	comparative,	a	
matter	of	seeing	what	we	make	of	alternative	ways	of	doing	things.	
	 Part	2	weaves	its	way	through	a	dense	and	nuanced	debate	between	Rorty	and	
ontologically	informed	continental	political	thought,	which	is	distilled	in	the	figure	of	
William	Connolly.	Rorty	resists	the	suggestion	that	his	philosophy	offers	a	better	
account	of	the	way	things	really	are,	whereas	the	ontologist	thinks	that	a	claim	about	
this,	however	fallible	and	contestable,	can’t	be	ducked.	For	Connolly,	the	world	is	
‘inherently	pluralistic/complex/becoming/fragile/etc.’,	and	resistant	to	human	
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purposes	(p.	117).	From	this	perspective,	Rorty	possesses	a	hidden	‘modernist’	ontology	
of	human	mastery	over	the	world,	assuming	that	it	is	susceptible	to	our	purposes.	Chin	
sees	Connolly	as	caught	on	a	dilemma:	he	must	either	prioritise	his	ontological	
commitments	or	prioritise	their	contestability.	Interestingly,	Chin’s	response	to	the	
criticism		that	Rorty	has	a	hidden	ontology	of	mastery	has	a	concessive	element	–	this	is	
a	claim	for	mastery	‘but	it	is	only	a	mastery	of	our	own	social	and	political	lives…	
[which]	is	ideally	suited	to	pluralistic	democratic	societies	where	competing	normative	
standards	meet	in	the	public’	(p.	144).		
	 In	Part	3,	Chin	outlines	the	normative	approach	that	follows	from	this	debate	
over	ontological	standing.	Here	he	broadens	the	focus,	drawing	on	Rorty’s	engagement	
with	critical	social	theory,	and	particularly	with	followers	of	Habermas,	who	also	try	to	
thread	an	anti-sceptical,	fallibilistic	path,	and	with	proponents	of	agonistic	democracy.	
Contemporary	political	theory	confronts	pluralism	along	at	least	two	dimensions,	he	
argues.	First,	there	is	the	methodological	question	for	political	theorists	of	how	to	
proceed	within	a	discipline	characterised	by	theoretical	diversity	and	differing	
ontological,	epistemological	and	sociological	assumptions	that	stand	behind	their	
critical	diagnoses	and	normative	prescriptions.	In	keeping	with	his	view	of	Rorty	as	
contributing	to	metatheory,	Chin	explores	‘the	methodological	question	of	how	diverse	
political	theories	should	relate	to	one	another,	especially	when	working	across	
traditional	barriers,	and	still	go	about	making	critical	and	normative	claims’	(p.	203).	
Second,	there	is	the	political	question:	how	can	democracy	respond	to	the	multifaceted	
theoretical	pluralism	of	modern	societies?	Here	Chin	sees	the	Rortyan	agenda	as	
enabling	‘egalitarian	engagement	across	linguistic-normative	difference’	(p.	205)	and	as	
taken	forward	by	the	kind	of	critical	dialogue	and	interaction	of	perspectives	that	we	
find	in	authors	such	as	James	Tully,	‘a	non-transcendental	yet	transcending	critique	of	
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the	horizons	of	our	practices	and	forms	of	thought	by	means	of	reciprocal	comparison	
and	contrast	with	other	possible	ways	of	being	in	the	world’	(Tully	2008:	35,	quoted	at	
p.	232).		
	 This	is	a	very	thoughtful,	sensitive	and	probing	study.	Its	impressive	and	
ambitious	breadth	of	theoretical	engagement	can’t	help	but	prompt	further	
conversation,	and	followers	of	Connolly,	New	Materialism,	Mouffe,	Habermas,	and	the	
others	with	whom	Chin	engages,	will	find	plenty	to	consider	in	the	dialectic	with	their	
respective	positions.	That	said,	the	book	as	a	whole	operates	at	quite	a	high	altitude:	
there	is	very	little	by	way	of	illustrative	example	to	flesh	out	some	of	the	rather	abstract	
claims	about	diversity	and	contestation,	and	nothing	on	Rorty’s	more	specific	political	
opinions	–	on	the	views	of	the	cultural	left,	inequality	and	authoritarianism	in	Achieving	
Our	Country	that	have	recently	been	given	fresh	and	alarming	life,	for	example.	Nor	is	
there	anything	of	Rorty’s	impish	provocativeness	that	readers	continue	to	find	
seductive	or	repellent.	This	steadiness	of	focus	may	reflect	the	entirely	creditable	desire	
on	Chin’s	part	to	guide	thinking	about	Rorty	out	of	tiresome	polemical	grooves	and	take	
him	in	new	directions.	Yet	this	also	suggests	some	ways	in	which	the	reader	is	left	
seeking	more	guidance	about	how	to	conduct	political	theory	in	this	Rortyan	key.	Let	
me	sketch	a	couple	of	brief	reflections	on	this.		
	 First,	ontology	seems	to	be	a	dimension	of	the	theoretical	pluralism	that	Chin	
takes	as	his	starting	point.	One	way	in	which	we	evaluate	theories,	or	think	of	them	as	
being	in	conflict,	is	through	their	fundamental	picture	of	what	makes	up	the	world.	We	
can	accept	this	without	adding	in	a	further	worry	about	the	priority	of	ontology:	rather,	
ontology	is	just	an	aspect	or	dimension	of	a	developed	theoretical	claim.	If	so,	then	we	
may	be	entitled	to	take	Rorty’s	theory	as	having	certain	ontological	features,	principally	
a	focus	on	language	and	on	a	variety	of	cognate	Rortyan	entities	such	as	texts,	
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redescriptions,	and	conversations.	And	if	we	accept	this,	then	there	seems	to	be	space	to	
discuss	and	evaluate	this	conception	in	comparison	with	other	ontological	conceptions.	
I’m	not	suggesting	that	Connolly	or	Mouffe,	for	instance,	offer	a	more	persuasive	set	of	
descriptive	assumptions;	only	that	ontology	can	be	a	legitimate	dimension	of	debate,	
without	requiring	a	priority	claim.	Chin	may	want	to	invoke	the	Rortyan	‘cultural	
politics’	move	in	response	to	this	suggestion	to	the	effect	that	we	should	focus	on	the	
‘utility’	of	these	descriptions	but	it’s	not	clear	that	it’s	a	move	he	quite	embraces	himself	
here,	as	opposed	to	attributing	it	to	Rorty.		
	 Second,	it’s	not	clear	how	eirenic	Rorty’s	approach	is	at	the	metatheoretical	level,	
in	this	kind	of	account.	Cultural	politics	asks	us	to	see	our	deepest	commitments	as	
contingent	cultural	products,	the	subject	of	‘reciprocal	comparison	and	contrast’	(p.	
232)	with	other	equally	contingent	products.	This	is	a	radically	revisionary	view	–	
definitely	not	an	instance	of	philosophy	leaving	everything	as	it	is.	And	notoriously,	as	
Rorty	recognised,	it	is	a	view	that	seems	to	require	much	less	by	way	of	self-
transformation	for,	well,	people	like	him	than	it	does	for	those	of	us	for	whom	validity	
or	divinity	provides	an	indispensable	underpinning	for	our	values.		How	does	this	then	
‘structure	interframework	dialogue	[…]	in	a	way	that	avoids	presuming	the	standards	of	
any	particular	perspective,	while	remaining	reflective	and	critical’	(p.	59)?		
	 It’s	testimony	to	the	quality	of	this	book	that	it	provokes	this	kind	of	question,	of	
course.	Chin	has	provided	an	indispensable	contribution	to	thinking	about	Rorty,	
pragmatism	and	new	paths	for	political	theory.	
	
Matthew	Festenstein	
University	of	York,	York,	YO10	5DD,	UK	
matthew.festenstein@york.ac.uk	
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